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OPINION OF THE COURT

Roth, Circuit Judge:
In this appeal, Charles T. Hutchins, appearing pro se,
and the Internal Revenue Service each challenge aspects of the
entry of summary judgment below.

The district court granted

summary judgment to the I.R.S. on its counterclaim to recoup an
erroneous tax credit, but then, disturbed by this result, invoked
equitable estoppel sua sponte to bar the I.R.S. from recovering
all but a minor portion its claim.

This holding necessarily

denied Hutchins' standing to sue for the original tax credit.
reverse.

We

Hutchins had standing to pursue his original tax claim

because in the bankruptcy proceedings that gave rise to this
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case, the tax refund descended to him through abandonment as part
of a properly scheduled antitrust action.

Because the I.R.S.

grounded its recoupment claim solely on Hutchins' lack of
standing, our ruling on this issue is dispositive.

We reach

neither the validity of the underlying tax refund, which is not
properly before us, nor the application of equitable estoppel,
which is rendered superfluous.
I.

Factual and Procedural History

In November 1979 Hutchins, as sole proprietor of
Hutchins Supply Company, filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petition in
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Anchorage, Alaska.

After the

initial scheduling of all known assets and liabilities pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1), Hutchins learned that his business had
failed because of his competitors' antitrust violations and
unfair business practices.

Hutchins instituted an antitrust

action against these competitors, amending his schedules to
reflect the antitrust cause of action as an asset of the bankrupt
estate.

By stipulation, the estate trustee allowed Hutchins to

pursue the action, reserving the right to all settlement
proceeds.

In 1986, the resulting claims were settled for

$243,000 in cash, which was turned over to the bankruptcy
trustee.

In addition, the antitrust defendants withdrew claims

against the bankrupt estate for approximately $76,000 in business
debt.

On January 27, 1987, the trustee filed an estate income

tax return reflecting both the cash and the retired debt as
income.
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On September 21, 1988, the trustee petitioned the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court to abandon any remaining assets to Hutchins. The
requisite order was issued on March 23, 1989.

The bankruptcy

proceedings were closed sometime prior to February 1989, reopened on March 1, 1989, and closed a second time on March 14,
1990.
On April 2, 1989, Hutchins filed an amended tax return
for 1987, asserting that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 108, the $76,000
in retired business debt was not taxable income.

Hutchins sought

a tax credit of $38,458, the amount he believed the trustee had
overpaid by erroneously including the $76,000 in retired business
debt as income.

On January 22, 1992, the I.R.S. granted in part

the claimed refund and applied a credit of $37,897.04 to
Hutchins' tax arrearages.

On September 29, 1992, Hutchins

responded by filing a complaint against the I.R.S. in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking, among
other relief, an additional credit of $650.

The I.R.S. responded

by counterclaiming for the entire January 1992 tax credit,
alleging it was granted erroneously since Hutchins was not the
proper party to receive a refund of taxes paid by the bankruptcy
estate.
On May 24, 1993, the district court dismissed Hutchins'
various prayers for relief on several grounds, leaving the
I.R.S.'s counterclaim as the sole remaining dispute.
has not been appealed.

That order

On January 10, 1994, on cross motions for

summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the I.R.S.
on its counterclaim, denied Hutchins' motion to dismiss, and
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invoked equitable estoppel to bar the I.R.S. from recovering all
but $663 plus interest from Hutchins.

Both parties appealed to

this court.
II.

Jurisdiction

The district court properly asserted federal
jurisdiction over the I.R.S.'s counterclaim under 26 U.S.C.
§7405(b).

We have jurisdiction over the district court's final

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
summary judgment is plenary.

Our review of a grant of

Oritani Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.

Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir. 1993); Goodman
v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
subject to plenary review.

The question of standing is itself

Polychrome Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5

F.3d 1522, 1530 n.19 (3d Cir. 1993).

III.

Discussion

In its counterclaim in district court, the I.R.S.
sought to recoup the entire tax credit it had granted Hutchins by
asserting that he lacked standing to pursue the discrepancy.

The

I.R.S. argued that because Hutchins had failed to schedule the
tax claim explicitly as an asset of the bankrupt estate, the
right to the refund was not abandoned but was instead retained by
the estate.

Since the refund belonged to that separately taxable

entity, only the trustee could sue for its recovery.
therefore had no basis for his claim.

Hutchins

Consequently, any tax

refund granted to Hutchins was erroneous and could be recovered.
The district court implicitly conceded this much in an elliptical
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comment1 followed by its sua sponte application of equitable
estoppel.

We disagree.

This line of reasoning ignores the fact

that the tax refund originated as part of the properly scheduled
antitrust action.

The refund claim was at best a derivative

asset that arose as a result of the trustee's tax filings on
behalf of the estate.

Moreover, the claim was not asserted until

after the bankruptcy had closed.

Since it existed during the

bankruptcy as an integral part of the antitrust claim--or if
separately as a still inchoate right--the tax claim was properly
scheduled through the scheduling of the antitrust action and
descended to Hutchins through abandonment.

Hutchins had standing

to sue.
A.
We observe in passing that if the tax refund were a
unique asset that had to be scheduled separately, as the I.R.S.
asserts, then the failure to schedule the refund is fatal to
Hutchins' claim.

It is clear that an asset must be properly

scheduled in order to pass to the debtor through abandonment
under 11 U.S.C. § 554.

See Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int'l

Transp. Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to
find unscheduled cause of action abandoned even where trustee was
aware of it prior to abandonment); In re Medley, 29 B.R. 84, 8687 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (refusing to abandon unscheduled
1

The opinion's only language on point read: "The Court
is unpersuaded by defendant's argument that the credit issued to
plaintiff's personal account should be completely rescinded
simply because plaintiff may have lacked standing to file the
amended return at issue." Hutchins v. United States, No. 92-4134
(GEB) slip op. at 5 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 1994) (emphasis added).
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refund claim to debtor); DiStasio v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
36, 52 (1990) (holding claim for refund abandoned only if
scheduled); Weiner v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 43, 45 (1988)
(retaining unscheduled tax refund claim as property of bankrupt
estate); see generally 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 554.03 (15th ed.
1994).

It is equally clear that since the bankrupt estate

retains unscheduled assets, only the bankruptcy trustee has the
authority to control them.

26 U.S.C. § 554(d) ("property . . .

not abandoned under this section . . . remains property of the
estate").

This authority includes the power to file an amended

tax return.

See 26 U.S.C. § 6012(b)(4) (requiring that fiduciary

for estate file estate return); see also Mindlin v. Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, 160 B.R. 508, 514 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("By operation of 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) and (d), any asset not
scheduled pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) remains property of the
estate, and the debtor loses all rights to enforce it under his
own name.").

These propositions, however, beg the fundamental

question raised by this dispute, viz. were the antitrust action
and tax refund claim separate assets?

If they were not, then the

tax refund was scheduled as part and parcel of the antitrust
claim, and it descended to Hutchins through abandonment.

After

reviewing the respective arguments, we conclude that during the
pendency of the bankruptcy, the tax refund existed as an inherent
part of the properly scheduled antitrust claim.
Initially, it bears noting that the tax refund in this
case differs from the tax refunds that typically appear as
unscheduled assets in bankruptcy proceedings.

The standard case
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of an unscheduled tax refund involves an expected refund computed
by the debtor and entered on a personal or corporate tax return,
which the debtor then fails to schedule after declaring
bankruptcy.

See, e.g., Mertz v. Rott, 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir.

1992) (considering estate tax refund that debtors anticipated but
failed to schedule); Doan v. Hudgins, 672 F.2d 831 (11th Cir.
1982) (considering debtor's failure to list expected tax refund);
Barowsky v. Serelson, 102 B.R. 250 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989)
(reopening bankruptcy after discovery of anticipated but
unscheduled income tax refund).

The scenario is even clearer

when the refund has already been paid by the I.R.S. and yet goes
unscheduled.

See In re Maynard, 162 B.R. 349 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

1993); In re Walton, 158 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).

In

either case, the debtor knows of the existence of the asset,
expects to receive it, and should have scheduled it.
The instant facts are different.

Here, the tax refund

was the result of action by the bankruptcy trustee, and the
claimed discrepancy was not asserted until after the bankruptcy
had closed.

More importantly, there was no reason for the debtor

or the trustee to assume, believe, or even guess that any refund
existed.

The taxes were paid on income from an antitrust

settlement, so there had been no prior withholding.

Assuming

that the trustee computed the tax correctly, there would be no
refund.2
2

When this opinion characterizes the actions of the
trustee as "correct", "incorrect", "erroneous" or the like, it
does so in the abstract. The validity of the underlying refund
is not before us, see discussion infra, and we express no opinion
9

These important factual distinctions indicate that at
the time of the bankruptcy, the crucial asset, indeed the only
asset, was the antitrust settlement.
"tax refund" asset existed.

During the bankruptcy, no

It was at best an inchoate right.

Creating the legal fiction that this asset arose at the time of
the erroneous filing and existed independently, albeit covertly,
would require every debtor to list as an additional asset a
potential tax refund due to the possibly erroneous filings of the
trustee.

Alternatively, the debtor would have to supervise and

double check the actions of the trustee, contrary to the
intention of 11 U.S.C. § 704, which makes the bankruptcy trustee
accountable for all property received.

See In re R.E. Lee &

Sons, Inc., 95 B.R. 316 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1989) (limiting debtor's
burden to reasonable diligence in completing schedules).

There

seems little to recommend either course as an innovation in
bankruptcy procedure.
Neither the district court nor the parties have cited
any authority addressing the status of an undiscovered tax refund
that arises post-petition as a result of the filings of the
trustee.

Our efforts have revealed no case on point.

The

extensive citations to cases on unscheduled assets are inapposite
if the tax refund did not yet exist.

Indeed, these cases would

support Hutchins' claim since he properly scheduled the only
on the propriety of the trustee's actions. We use these terms in
our discussion of standing because Hutchins' original tax refund
depended on a filing error by the trustee. These
characterizations have emerged as a necessary part of the case as
framed by the parties, and the court adopts them as a
convenience.
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existing asset, the antitrust proceeds.

Despite the absence of

authority, both parties offer arguments on the issue, and logic
dictates the result.
First, we agree with Hutchins that "[i]t was not the
appellant's right, position or responsibility to amend his
schedules to reflect trustee's accounting and tax payment
errors."

Brief of Appellant at 16.

Hutchins appears to contend

that, as suggested above, he had no reason to suspect the error
and hence the existence of the refund.
necessary implication:

We make explicit the

The tax refund was not a known asset at

the time of the bankruptcy and so could not be scheduled
separately pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1).
Further support flows from the concept of valuation. At
the time of the bankruptcy, the principal asset for distribution
to creditors was the income from the antitrust settlement.
Creditors could reasonably assume that the estate would owe tax
on this money, so the net value of the asset was the amount of
the proceeds less the correct amount of tax. Alternatively,
creditors could expect the net value to equal the amount of the
proceeds less the amount of tax paid by the trustee plus the
amount of any tax refund.

There is no need to take this latter

course, which unnecessarily creates two assets from a single
fund.

Instead, the antitrust cause of action cum tax refund can

best be viewed as a single asset that was inadvertently
misappraised by the bankruptcy trustee.

Assuming for the moment

that Hutchins is correct on the merits of the tax refund, the
trustee's failure to complete the tax return correctly
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effectively undervalued the antitrust claim by approximately
$37,000.

This mistake was not discovered until after

abandonment.

It is well established in bankruptcy law that

mistakes in valuation will not enable the trustee to recover an
abandoned asset.

In re McGowan, 95 B.R. 104 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa

1988) (ruling that abandonment of misvalued asset is
irrevocable); Matter of Enriquez, 22 B.R. 934 (Bankr. Neb. 1982)
(same).
We find these arguments persuasive.

We are less

impressed with the I.R.S.'s conclusory assertion that the
antitrust cause of action was "clearly a separate asset" from the
tax refund.

Nor are we swayed by the agency's cursory

comparison:
The antitrust action involved damage claims
against various of Hutchins's competitors.
The Government was not a party to that
action, and no federal income tax issues were
involved. Here, in contrast, the Government
is a party, the issue is one of taxation, and
neither the competitors nor antitrust
violations are of concern.
Brief of Appellee at 21.

While an accurate description of the

two causes of action as they currently stand, these distinctions
ignore the fact that the relevant time period for scheduling is
not the onset of subsequent litigation but rather the pendency of
the bankruptcy.

At that point, no separate tax refund asset

existed, or to the extent that it did, it was subsumed in the
original declaration of the value of the antitrust proceeds.
Our review of these arguments indicates that the tax
refund was properly scheduled to the extent that it could be.
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Hutchins scheduled the only asset of which he was aware, the
antitrust claim.

The tax refund arose later as a result of the

actions of the trustee.

Hutchins did not cause the trustee to

file an erroneous tax return, and he had no reason to suspect its
existence.

Indeed, the discrepancy was not discovered until

after the close of the bankruptcy.

We hold that Hutchins acted

properly in scheduling his assets.
B.
This resolution of the scheduling issue necessitates
the conclusion that Hutchins had standing to sue for the tax
refund.

Since he properly scheduled the antitrust claim, the

right to the refund descended to him through abandonment.
Hutchins scheduled the antitrust claim properly.

On

April 7, 1983, he filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court a Motion to
File Amended Schedule B - Statement of All Property of Debtor.
Page 6, line 17 of the amended Schedule B reflected "unliquidated
antitrust claims."

This filing scheduled the antitrust claim

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1).

The tax claim was necessarily

scheduled through this action.
Hutchins then received the right to this tax claim as
an undifferentiated part of the antitrust claim he acquired
through abandonment.

On September 21, 1988, the trustee moved

pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) for an order "that any remaining
property scheduled by the debtor(s) be abandoned to the debtor(s)
and that any further interest in said property be disclaimed." On
March 23, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court entered the requisite
Abandonment Order.
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Through the abandonment of the antitrust claim,
Hutchins held the right to the potential tax refund on April 2,
1989, when he filed the amended tax return.

As a result, he had

standing to contest the I.R.S.'s decision regarding his refund.
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6402(a), 6511(a), 7422(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a);
see also Boryan v. United States, 690 F.Supp. 459, 463 (E.D. Va.
1988).
C.
Although as a general rule an affirmative holding on
standing is merely a precursor to consideration of the merits, in
the instant case it disposes of the controversy.

The I.R.S.

cannot prevail as a matter of law because it took no position in
the district court on the underlying validity of the refund.

The

I.R.S. chose to assert only the claim that the refund was paid to
the wrong party, and this argument depended on Hutchins' lack of
standing.

Our contrary conclusion resolves the case.

We decline

to consider an insufficiently explored, fact-specific, nondispositive theory that was not raised below.
On appeal, the I.R.S. attempts to argue for the first
time that the underlying basis of Hutchins' claimed tax refund is
incorrect because the discharge of debt by the antitrust
defendants is not excludible income.
14, 28-33.

Brief of Appellee at 13,

This argument was not asserted at the trial level.

The I.R.S.'s eleventh hour Reply Brief reference to an isolated
footnote in the record supports rather than contradicts this
conclusion.

See Reply Brief of Appellee at 3.
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Under the prudential policy recognized in Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941), we need not consider the
I.R.S.'s new argument.

See Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925 (3d

Cir. 1984); Toyota Indus. Trucks U.S.A. Inc. v. Citizen Nat'l
Bank, 611 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Singleton v.
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976).

The reference discovered by the

I.R.S. is remarkable only in its unobtrusiveness.

A lone and

diminutive footnote does not constitute the assertion of a legal
theory, especially when the same theory merited seven pages in
the I.R.S.'s appellate brief.

See Brief of Appellee at 27-34.

Had the issue truly been asserted at the trial level, these seven
closely argued pages would not have been needed.

More

importantly, it is by no means clear that the I.R.S.'s newfound
champion can carry the day.

The argument ultimately turns on

whether the $76,000 in claims against the bankrupt estate that
was retired by the antitrust defendants represents "discharge of
indebtedness" excludible under 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) or instead
taxable income for which the discharged debt is merely the
"medium of payment."

See United States v. Centennial Savings

Bank F.S.B., 499 U.S. 573, 582 n.7 (1991).

Further factual

development would be required to resolve this issue and determine
the extent of any resulting tax differential.
tribunal is not the proper forum for this task.

An appellate
See Newark

Morning Ledger v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir.
1976).
Put simply, the I.R.S.'s contentions regarding the
merits of the tax refund come too late.

In the district court,
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the I.R.S. based its counterclaim solely on standing, and only
that issue is properly before us.

Our contrary disposition of

this point resolves the case.
D.
The district court invoked equitable estoppel sua
sponte because its holding on standing left no bar to the
I.R.S.'s recoupment of the tax credit, a sanction the court found
overly severe.

We are disturbed that estoppel would be applied

by the district court without allowing the parties to voice their
opposition to it.

Our conclusion, however, renders this issue

superfluous, and we need not reach it.

IV.

Conclusion

Contrary to the holding of the district court, Hutchins
had standing to sue as a matter of law.

Because at the trial

level the I.R.S. based its counterclaim solely on the absence of
standing, we will reverse and remand with instructions to enter
summary judgment in favor of Hutchins.

In doing so, we note only

that appellant must consider himself the fortunate beneficiary of
the appellee's litigation strategy.

Had the I.R.S. assiduously

pressed the validity of the tax refund at the trial level,
Hutchins could well have lost his $37,897 bird in the hand in an
ill-conceived grasp at $650 in the bush.
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